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Abstract: The explosive number of vehicles has given rise to a series of traffic problems, such as
traffic congestion, road safety, and fuel waste. Collecting vehicles’ speed information is an effective
way to monitor the traffic conditions and avoid vehicles’ congestion, however it may threaten
vehicles’ location and trajectory privacy. Motivated by the fact that traffic monitoring does not need
to know each individual vehicle’s speed and the average speed would be sufficient, we propose
a privacy-preserving traffic monitoring (PPTM) scheme to aggregate vehicles’ speeds at different
locations. In PPTM, the roadside unit (RSU) collects vehicles’ speed information at multiple road
segments, and further cooperates with a service provider to calculate the average speed information
for every road segment. To preserve vehicles’ privacy, both homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem
and super-increasing sequence are adopted. A comprehensive security analysis indicates that the
proposed PPTM can preserve vehicles’ identities, speeds, locations, and trajectories privacy from
being disclosed. In addition, extensive simulations are conducted to validate the effectiveness and
efficiency of the proposed PPTM scheme.
Keywords: traffic monitoring; speed; privacy-preserving; vehicular crowdsourcing
1. Introduction
Nowadays, the number of global vehicles has exceeded 1.2 billion and may be headed to 2 billion
by 2035 [1]. With such a large number of vehicles, many critical social problems, such as traffic
congestions and slow traffic, have emerged, leading to significant time and fuel waste. According to
a report released by Harvard Center, for the drivers in the 10 most-congested cities in USA, more than
48 h are wasted in traffic jams, causing $121 billion loss in time and fuel every year [2]. To deal with
these critical problems, both industry and academia are paying great attention to traffic monitoring,
and the vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) is considered as one of the most promising ways that can
be leveraged in traffic management [3,4].
In VANETs, vehicles, embedded with onboard units (OBUs), can share traffic information
(e.g., locations and speeds) to the roadside units (RSUs) through vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I)
communications, and nearby vehicles by vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications [5]. By collecting
and analyzing this traffic information, vehicles can easily know different locations’ traffic conditions
and road safety, and accordingly plot their optimal routes. Recently, several VANET-based traffic
monitoring applications have been built. For example, Google and Apple provide real-time navigation
services based on current traffic information [6]. Waze has developed an application that can help
drivers get the best route with real-time help from other drivers [7]. Although many benefits can be
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brought by this emerging network paradigm, its adoption still hinges on how to resolve security and
privacy concerns for the users. Since a vehicle’s location is tightly bundled with its driver, an attacker
can predict a driver’s future location based on his vehicle’s trajectory, or even infer the drivers’ personal
information, such as habits, health condition, income, and religious belief, according to their frequently
visited places.
To preserve the vehicles’ privacy, pseudonyms and anonymous authentication are two effective
ways to conceal vehicles’ real identities and realize conditional privacy preservation [8–11].
For example, Ni et al. [12] proposed a privacy-preserving real-time navigation system by collecting
vehicles’ location and speed information, and, with the randomization technique, the sensitive identity
privacy is preserved. However, the work in [13] shows that user identities can sometimes be inferred
from the location data if users’ home and work locations are deduced from the data. Moreover,
we observe an attack that, by linking vehicles’ speed information, vehicles can also be identified
even if they change their pseudonyms. An example is illustrated in Figure 1. At time t1, a vehicle
provides its speed information PIDA||v1||L1||t1 to a roadside unit (RSU), and at time t2, it uploads the
speed information PIDB||v2||L2||t2, where v denotes the average speed in the road segment, L denotes
the location, and t represents the current time. Although the vehicle’s pseudonym is changed (i.e.,
PIDA → PIDB), attackers can still link the pseudonyms by comparing the estimated passing time (the
average passing time can be calculated by using the distance and average speed, and the distance from
L1 to L2 can be obtained from GPS) and actual passing time (i.e., t2 − t1) between these two locations.
Thus, there still lacks a privacy-preserving traffic monitoring scheme that can protect the vehicles’
identities and defend against the linkable attack.
In this paper, to deal with the above challenges, we propose a privacy-preserving traffic
monitoring (PPTM) scheme to enable vehicles provide their traffic information without sacrificing their
privacy. This scheme uses the homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem to guarantee the privacy of vehicles’
speeds, and adopts a well-defined super-increasing sequence to not only protect vehicles’ location
privacy, but also save tremendous computational costs and communication overhead. Our main
contributions can be further summarized below.
• First, inspired by the fact that the average speed would be sufficient to achieve traffic monitoring,
we propose PPTM, which uses the super-increasing sequence and homomorphic Paillier
cryptosystem to realize privacy-preserving speed aggregation and efficient traffic monitoring.
Concretely, each vehicle uses a well defined super-increasing sequence to aggregate its multiple
speeds and encrypts the aggregated result before uploading it to the RSU. Then, the RSU will
aggregate all reports and cooperate with a service provider to calculate each road segment’s
average speed. During this process, vehicles’ identity, speed, and location privacy will not be
disclosed to any other party.
• Second, we find that the anonymous technologies such as pseudonyms and randomizable
signature are not suitable for certain VANET-based applications because of the time link attack.
To mitigate this attack, we design a privacy-preserving data aggregation approach. Through
a comprehensive security analysis, the proposed PPTM is proven to be secure and privacy
preservation. Particularly, the proposed scheme can achieve report privacy preservation, report
authentication, data integrity, and identity preservation, as well as defend against the collusion
attack. The detailed analysis is given in Section 5.
• Third, we conducted extensive simulations to show PPTM is practical and efficient. Compared
with a traditional baseline scheme, PPTM could significantly reduce computational costs and
communication overhead, indicating that the proposed scheme can indeed realize real-time
traffic monitoring.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the system model,
security requirement, and design goals of the proposed PPTM scheme. In Section 3, preliminaries
including bilinear pairings and Paillier cryptosystem are introduced. The detailed introduction of
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PPTM is given in Section 4. In Sections 5 and 6, we analyze the security and performance of PPTM,
respectively. In Section 7, some related works are listed, and we draw our conclusion in Section 8.
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Figure 1. Using passing time to link pseudonyms.
2. System Model, Security Requirements, and Design goals
In this section, we formalize the proposed scheme by giving the system model, threat model, and
design goals.
2.1. System Model
In the proposed PPTM scheme, roads are divided into multiple segments and vehicles are expected
to provide their average speed for each segment they have passed through. A typical RSU-assisted
VANET application is illustrated in Figure 2. In particular, the considered system model consists of the
following entities.
• Trust authority (TA): TA is a fully trusted entity that is responsible for the registration of vehicles
and RSUs. It builds public/secret key pairs for all entities, and generates sufficient pseudonyms
for vehicles before their next registration.
• Vehicles: All vehicles are embedded with OBUs, which enable them to communicate with RSUs
and surrounding vehicles through wireless communications. Besides, they also have the ability to
generate and run their own homomorphic cryptosystem.
• RSUs: RSUs act as the role of access points, which are widely deployed in the urban area.
They can communicate with vehicles via wireless communications and the service provider by
wired communications.
• Service provider (SP): SP is a centralized entity that is responsible for providing traffic monitoring
services. It connects with all RSUs through fast communication technology, such as wired cables.
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Figure 2. Using trust values to link pseudonyms in a given time period.
2.2. Security Requirements
In our security model, TA is fully trusted as it is responsible for initializing the whole system
and generating credentials and public/private keys for all participating entities. SP and RSUs are
considered to be honest-but-curious, which means both will strictly follow the designed protocol,
but are curious about vehicles’ privacy. In particular, we assume there is no collusion between SP and
RSUs, which is similar to most existing RSU-assisted scenarios [14,15]. Meanwhile, we assume that
vehicles will provide correct speed information to the RSU. This assumption is reasonable in most
traffic monitoring scenarios, since: (1) the speed provided by vehicles is in the area where they have
passed through, and providing false data would not benefit them; and (2) vehicles want to know the
correct traffic conditions, and thus will honestly follow the designed protocol for their mutual benefits.
Besides, we also assume there exists an attacker which is curious about drivers’ privacy. It may
launch attacks, modify speed reports, and threaten data integrity. Based on the above assumptions,
the proposed scheme should achieve the following security requirements.
Identity Privacy Preservation. As described above, an attacker can potentially identify drivers
even though they adopt pseudonyms and anonymous authentication. Thus, to preserve drivers’
identity privacy, attackers cannot infer vehicles’ location information (i.e., road segments) based on the
given data.
Location Privacy Preservation. Since the speed is location-aware, preserving drivers’ location
privacy requires preventing their speed from being disclosed. Hence, the proposed scheme should
ensure that, even if the RSU or an attacker receives a vehicle’s speed information, it cannot recover its
speed and further infer its location privacy.
Data Integrity. An attacker may eavesdrop drivers’ reports and modify them for its benefits. Thus,
the proposed scheme should guarantee data integrity and any malicious operations should be detected.
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2.3. Design Goals
Based on the aforementioned security requirements, our goal is to design a privacy-preserving
traffic monitoring scheme, which enables vehicles to upload their speeds towards the RSU securely
and efficiently. Concretely, the proposed scheme should achieve the following two design goals.
The defined security requirements should be guaranteed. If the proposed scheme fails to realize
the aforementioned security requirements, drivers’ identity and location privacy may be disclosed,
and data reports transmitted to the RSU or other vehicles may be modified. Then, vehicles may be
reluctant to provide their speed, and traffic conditions will not be accurately estimated.
High efficiency should be guaranteed. To provide real-time traffic monitoring, vehicles are expected
to upload speed information in a short transmission interval. However, to preserve drivers’ privacy,
sensitive information should be encrypted, which may introduce tremendous computational costs and
bandwidth consumption for resource-constrained vehicles. Thus, the proposed scheme should achieve
high efficiency in computational costs and communication overhead.
3. Preliminaries
In this section, we review the pairing-based cryptography [16] and the Paillier cryptosystem [17],
which serve as the basis of our proposed traffic monitoring scheme.
3.1. Bilinear Pairings
Suppose there are two cyclic groups G1 and G2, both of which share a same order q. Then,
a bilinear map e : G1 ×G1 → G2 has the following properties.
• Bilinearity: e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)ab ∈ G2, for all P, Q ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z∗q .
• Non-degeneracy: e(P, P) 6= 1, for all P ∈ G1.
• Computability: e(P, Q) can be efficiently computed, for all P, Q ∈ G1.
By referring to [18,19], we give two more comprehensive definitions for bilinear pairings.
Definition 1. Given an input security parameter κ, Gen is a probabilistic algorithm to output a 5-tuple
(q, P,G1,G2, e), in which q is a κ-bit prime, P is a generator, (G1,G2) are two cyclic groups sharing a same
order q, and e : G1 ×G1 → G2 is an efficient, computable, and non-degenerated bilinear map.
Definition 2 (Computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) Problem). Given elements (P, aP, bP) ∈ G1,
there exists no effective algorithm can calculate abP ∈ G1 for unknown a, b ∈ Z∗q in a probabilistic and
polynomial time.
3.2. Paillier Cryptosystem
As an effective technology to achieve homomorphic properties on the ciphertexts, Paillier
cryptosystem has been widely used in various privacy-preserving applications. Concretely,
three algorithms are included in the Paillier cryptosystem.
• Key Generation: With a security parameter κ1, select two large κ1-bit primes p1, q1, and calculate
n = p1q1 and the least common multiple of p1 and q1, i.e., λ = lcm(p1, q1). Then, define a function
L(a) = a−1n , and calculate µ = (L(g
λ mod n2))−1 mod n2, where g ∈ Z∗n. Then, the public/private
keys are pk = (n, g) and sk = (λ, mu).
• Message Encryption: Given a plaintext m ∈ Zn, after choosing a random value r ∈ Z∗n, the message
is encrypted as c = E(m) = gm · rn mod n2.
• Ciphertext Decryption: Given a ciphertext c = E(m) ∈ Z∗n2 , the message is recovered as m =
D(c) = L(cλ mod n
2
) · µ mod n.
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Note that Paillier cryptosystem has been proven to be correct, secure, and effective against
the chosen plaintext attack [17]. Moreover, Paillier cryptosystem allows arithmetic operations on
ciphertexts, such as E(m1) · E(m2) = E(m1 + m2) and E(m1)a = E(a ·m1), for all (m1, m2) ∈ Z∗n.
4. Proposed PPTM Scheme
In this section, we give the details of the proposed PPTM scheme, which includes system
initialization, speed request and speed reporting, privacy-preserving report aggregation, secure report
reading, and traffic guidance and identity tracing.
4.1. System Initialization
TA initializes the whole system. After selecting two security numbers κ, κ1, it first runs Gen(κ)
to generate a 5-tuple (q, P,G1,G2, e) and calculates public/private keys of the Paillier cryptosystem,
i.e., pk = (n, g), sk = (λ, µ), according to κ1. Then, TA selects a secure cryptographic hash function
H, where H : {0, 1}∗ → G1. Vehicles are required to register themselves periodically. TA chooses
a secure key k0 and generates a secure symmetric encryption algorithm AESk0 . For every registered
vehicle with its real identity number IDi (the real ID can be license number or social secure number),
TA generates a group of pseudonyms {PIDij = AESk0(IDi||xij)}nj=1 by choosing a set of random
values {xij}nj=1 ∈ Z∗q . Then, TA uses xij as each vehicle’s certified private key and calculates the
corresponding public key as Yij = xijP. For each RSU with its identity number IDr, TA selects a random
number xr ∈ Z∗q as its private key and calculates the public key as Yr = xrP. Finally, TA publishes
{(P,G1,G2, e, H), (n, g)} and sends {{PIDij, xij, Yij}nj=1, (IDr, Yr)} to each vehicle, {IDr, xr, Yr} to each
RSU, and (λ, µ, IDr, Yr) to SP.
In addition, in the coverage of an RSU, roads are divided into multiple segments. Assume that
the maximum number of segments within the coverage of each RSU is M, the number of vehicles
in every segment is no more than Q, and the maximum speed in every road segment is smaller
than V. Then, for the segments located in each RSU’s coverage, TA generates a super-increasing
sequence −→a = (a1, a2, · · · , aM), where ai denotes the ith segment such that ai ∈ Z∗n is randomly
chosen, ∑
j−1
i=1 ai ·Q ·V < aj for j = 2, 3. · · · , M, and ∑Mi=1 ai ·Q ·V < n.
4.2. Speed Request and Speed Reporting
Figure 3 illustrates the system procedure of PPTM. As can be seen, RSU first generates a speed
request and all vehicles response it by providing their driving reports. Specifically, the request contains
the RSU’s ID, the current timestamp TS, the time range TR, and the signature σr = xr H(IDr||TS||TR).
Note that, the timestamp is used to defend against the replay attack launched by forged RSUs.
Then, the RSU broadcasts the request Rr = IDr||TS||TR||σr to vehicles driving in its communication
coverage. After receiving this request, vehicles first verify the report by examining whether e(P, σr)
equals to e(Yr, H(IDr||TS||TR)). If the equation holds, the request will be accepted, since e(P, σr) =
e(xrP, H(IDr||TS||TR)) = e(Yr, H(IDr||TS||TR||)).
If the request is valid, vehicles are expected to provide their speed reports. The format of speed is
defined as {(i, ti(j), Ai(j), Si(j))}M,Vi=1,j=1, where ti(j) denotes the time passing by the ith segment for
the vehicle Vj, and {Ai(j), Si(j)} are calculated as follows,
Ai(j) =
{
1 if Vj has passed by the segment i
0 if Vj has not passed by the segment i
Si(j) =
{
vi(j) if Vj has passed by the segment i
0 if Vj has not passed by the segment i
where vi(j) is Vj’s average speed when passing by the segment i. Note that the speed report is time
series data, which means the reports will be sorted in time order. For example, if a vehicle has gone
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through the segments in order of 1, 4, and 5, with the average speed 50, 75, and 60, its speed reports
are represented as {(1, 5, 1, 50), (4, 3.5, 1, 75), (5, 2, 1, 60)}. Then, given a time range as 8, the vehicle
should submit the speed report {(5, 2, 1, 60), (4, 3.5, 1, 75)} since 2+ 3.5 < 8. To preserve the privacy of
location and speed privacy, the report should be encrypted before uploaded to the RSU. The vehicle Vj
selects two random values rj1, rj2 ∈ Z∗n and calculates the ciphertexts as Cj1 = g(a1·A1(j)+···+aM ·AM(j)) ·
rnj1 mod n
2 and Cj2 = g(a1·S1(j)+···+aM ·SM(j)) · rnj2 mod n2. Then, the vehicle signs the report with its
secret key by computing σj = xjH(PIDj||Yj||Cj1||Cj2||TS). After that, Vj delivers the speed report
Rj = PIDj||Yj||Cj1||Cj2||TS||σj to the RSU.
1. Speed request
2. Speed report
3. Aggregated reports
4. Traffic guidance
5. Traffic guidance
Vehicle RSU SP
Figure 3. System procedure of PPTM.
4.3. Privacy-Preserving Report Aggregation
Upon receiving the report, RSU first checks the freshness of this report, i.e., to make sure
that the difference between request and response is within a certain range. Then, the RSU
verifies the vehicle’s report by examining e(P, σj)
?
= e(Yj, H(PIDj||Yj||Cj1||Cj2||TS)) as e(P, σj) =
e(xjP, H(PIDj||Yj||Cj1||Cj2||TS)) = e(Yj, H(PIDj||Yj||Cj1||Cj2||TS)). Especially, to improve efficiency,
RSU can perform batch verification to check e(P,∑Nj=1 σj)
?
= ∏Nj=1 e(Yj, H(PIDj||Yj||Cj1||Cj2||TS)),
where N is the number of vehicles passing by every segment. The proof is given below.
e(P,
N
∑
j=1
σj) =e(P,
N
∑
j=1
xj H(PIDj||Yj||Cj1||Cj2||TS))
=
N
∏
j=1
e(P, xjH(PIDj||Yj||Cj1||Cj2||TS))
=
N
∏
j=1
e(Yj, H(PIDj||Yj||Cj1||Cj2||TS)).
(1)
By performing this operation, fewer time-consuming pairing operations e(·, ·) are required (i.e.,
2N vs. N + 1).
After checking the validity of vehicles’ reports, the RSU executes the following steps to obtain the
aggregated results in a privacy-preserving way.
• Step 1. Calculate the aggregated results C1 and C2 based on the encrypted data {Cj1}Nj=1 and
{Cj2}Nj=1 as follows.
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
C1 =
N
∏
j=1
Cj1 mod n2
=
N
∏
j=1
ga1·A1(j)+···+aM ·AM(j) · rnj1 mod n2
= ga1 ∑
N
j=1 A1(j)+···+aM ∑Nj=1 AM(j) · (
N
∏
j=1
rj1)n mod n2
C2 =
N
∏
j=1
Cj2 mod n2
=
N
∏
j=1
ga1·S1(j)+···+aM ·SM(j) · rnj2 mod n2
= ga1 ∑
N
j=1 S1(j)+···+aM ∑Nj=1 SM(j) · (
N
∏
j=1
rj2)n mod n2
(2)
• Step 2. Use the secret key xr to generate a signature as
σr = xr H(IDr||C1||C2||TS). (3)
• Step 3. Send the aggregated and encrypted data IDr||C1||C2||TS||σr to the SP.
For ease of understanding, we give an example to show how aggregated vehicle and speed
are aggregated, as shown in Figure 4. The RSU receives the ciphertexts of four speed reports
{R1, R2, R3, R4}, each of which contains four segments. After performing the aggregations,
the aggregated results of vehicle and speed are the ciphertexts of ai ∑4j=1 Ai(j) and ai ∑
4
j=1 Si(j),
respectively, where i ∈ [1, 4]. In the following, we show how to recover the aggregated vehicles
and speeds for every segment.
ܴଵ
ܴଶ
ܴଷܴସ
{ܽଵ כ 1, ܽଵ כ 50} {ܽଶ כ 0,ܽଶ כ 0} {ܽଷ כ 0, ܽଷ כ 0} {ܽସ כ 1, ܽସ כ 36}
{ܽଵ כ 1,ܽଵ כ 60} {ܽଶ כ 1, ܽଶ כ 80} {ܽଷ כ 0, ܽଷ כ 0}
{ܽଵ כ 0, ܽଵ כ 0} {ܽଶ כ 1, ܽଶ כ 88} {ܽଷ כ 1, ܽଷ כ 40} {ܽସ כ 1, ܽସ כ 33}
{ܽଵ כ 1,ܽଵ כ 55} {ܽଶ כ 1, ܽଶ כ 75} {ܽଷ כ 1, ܽଷ כ 35} {ܽସ כ 1, ܽସ כ 35}
ܽଵ כ 3 ܽଶ כ 3 ܽଷ כ 2 ܽସ כ 4
{ܽସ כ 1, ܽସ כ 30}
ܽଵ כ 165 ܽଶ כ 243 ܽଷ כ 75 ܽସ כ 134
Segment 1 Segment 2 Segment 3 Segment 4
+ + +
+ + +
+ + +
+ + +
+ + +
+ + +
Aggregated vehicle
Aggregated speed
Figure 4. Traffic aggregation example in PPTM.
4.4. Secure Report Reading
On receiving the aggregated report, SP first checks data validity by examining e(P, σr)
?
=
e(Yr, H(IDr||C1||C2||TS)), and then performs the following steps to recover the aggregated results
from the ciphertexts,
• Step 1. Considering M1 = a1 ∑Nj=1 A1(j) + · · · + aM ∑Nj=1 AM(j), M2 = a1 ∑Nj=1 S1(j) + · · · +
aM ∑Nj=1 SM(j) and R1 = ∏
N
j=1 rj1, R2 = ∏
N
j=1 rj2, the aggregated ciphertexts C1 = g
M1 ·
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Rn1 mod n
2, C2 = gM2 · Rn2 mod n2 are still valid ciphertexts of Paillier cryptosystem. Hence,
the SP can use the secret key (λ, µ) to obtain M1 and M2 as
M1 = D(C1) = a1
N
∑
j=1
A1(j) + · · ·+ aM
N
∑
j=1
AM(j) mod n2
M2 = D(C2) = a1
N
∑
j=1
S1(j) + · · ·+ aM
N
∑
j=1
SM(j) mod n2
(4)
• Step 2. SP then invokes Algorithm 1 to recover the aggregated vehicles (L1, L2, · · · , LM) and
speed (LS1, LS2, · · · , LSM), where Li = ∑Nj=1 Ai(j) and LSi = ∑Nj=1 Si(j), i ∈ [1, M].
Algorithm 1: Recover the aggregated report.
Input: M1, M2, and
−→a
Output: {Li}Mi=1 and {LSi}Mi=1
1 Set LM = ∑Mi=1 ∑Nj=1 ai Ai(j) mod n2,LS = ∑Mi=1 ∑Nj=1 aiSi(j) mod n2;
2 for i = M, M− 1, · · · 2 do
3 Li−1 = Li mod ai, Li = Li−Li−1ai ;
4 LS i−1 = LS i mod ai, LSi = LS i−LS i−1ai ;
5 L1 =
L1
a1
; LS1 =
LS1
a1
;
6 return {Li, LSi}Mi=1
The correctness of Algorithm 1. For ease of description, we use the aggregated vehicles to give the
correctness analysis. In this algorithm, LM = a1 ∑Nj=1 A1(j)+ a2 ∑Nj=1 A2(j)+ · · · aM−1 ∑Nj=1 AM−1(j)+
aM ∑Nj=1 AM(j). As the number of aggregated vehicles in every segment is smaller than Q, we have
a1
N
∑
j=1
A1(j) + · · · aM−1
N
∑
j=1
AM−1(j) < (a1 + · · ·+ aM−1) ·Q
=
M−1
∑
i=1
Q < aM.
(5)
Hence, LM−1 = LM mod aM = a1 ∑Nj=1 A1(j) + · · ·+ aM−1 ∑Nj=1 AM−1(j), and accordingly we
have
LM −LM−1
aM
=
aM ∑Nj=1 AM(j)
aM
= LM. (6)
Following a similar analysis, Li = ∑Nj=1 Ai(j) can be proven. In addition, we can prove LSi =
∑Nj=1 Si(j), as it shares the similar procedure as Li.
4.5. Traffic Guidance and Identity Tracing
After calculating the aggregated vehicles and speeds in all segments, i.e., (L1, L2, · · · , LM) and
(LS1, LS2, · · · , LSM), the average speed in each segment can be computed as Li = LSiLi . Finally,
SP broadcasts the speed information and vehicles can select optimal routes based on the road conditions.
In addition, although we assume that all vehicles report their speeds honestly, some vehicles may still
upload false traffic data. In this case, the TA can periodically select some speed reports stored in the
RSU and recover them to check whether they are truthful. Since vehicles’ pseudonyms are generated
by using vehicles’ real identity ID, malicious vehicles can be easily and quickly identified.
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5. Security Analysis
In this section, we give the security analysis of the proposed PPTM scheme. In particular, recalling
the aforementioned security requirements, the analysis focuses on how our proposed PPTM scheme
can protect each vehicle’s report privacy, ensure report authentication and data integrity, and achieve
vehicles’ identity and location privacy preservation.
The proposed scheme can achieve report privacy preservation. The proposed scheme preserves reports’
privacy by using the Paillier cryptosystem. In PPTM, vehicle Vj’s location and speed are formed
as Cj1, Cj2. Since both ciphertexts are valid ciphertexts of Paillier cryptosystem and the Paillier
cryptosystem has been proven to be secure under the chosen plaintext attack, the messages are secure
and privacy-preserving. That is, although an adversary may eavesdrop a ciphertext, it cannot recover
the corresponding message. After receiving all reports from vehicles, instead of recovering each
report, the RSU will perform report aggregation and deliver the aggregated ciphertext to the SP. Thus,
even though SP holds the secret key, it can only obtain the aggregated result. Therefore, each individual
vehicle’s report is privacy-preserving in the proposed PPTM scheme.
The proposed scheme can achieve report authentication and data integrity. In our proposed scheme,
vehicles’ reports and RSU’s aggregated report are signed using BLS short signature [20]. Since it has
been proven that BSL short signature can defend against the CDH problem [21], our proposed scheme
can guarantee the report authentication and data integrity, and any malicious behavior on the vehicles’
reports will be detected.
The proposed scheme can protect vehicles’ identity privacy. In our proposed scheme, vehicles
periodically update their pseudonyms from TA. By changing pseudonyms, vehicles are able to keep
themselves anonymous. Moreover, the proposed scheme is also effective to defend against the possible
link attack presented in [13], since each vehicle’s route (i.e., road segment) is aggregated and encrypted.
By this way, attackers cannot infer where vehicles have been based on the given data, and accordingly
cannot link their identities. Besides, although SP can obtain the aggregated vehicle information, it is
infeasible for it to recover each individual vehicle’s route. Therefore, vehicles’ identity privacy is
preserved in the proposed PPTM scheme.
The proposed scheme can protect vehicles’ location privacy. In our proposed scheme, vehicles’ location
privacy is preserved by aggregating their route reports. Considering the speed is location-aware,
attackers may infer vehicles’ locations based on the speed information. In this case, our proposed
scheme is still effective, since in PPTM each individual speed is also aggregated and encrypted.
Similarly, since all speed reports are also aggregated in the RSU, SP cannot obtain each individual
vehicle’s speed information. Thus, vehicles’ location privacy is preserved.
The proposed scheme can resist collusion attacks. The basic idea to mitigate collusion attacks is to
ensure the separation of data between different entities. In PPTM, with the assumption that RSU does
not collude with SP, neither of them can know each individual vehicle’s privacy. More specifically,
the RSU cannot know vehicles’ reports since they are encrypted by using the SP’s public key. The SP
can decrypt the summation of vehicles and speed in each segment, while not knowing each individual
vehicle’s data.
6. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed PPTM scheme in terms of
computational costs of vehicles and RSU, and communication overhead of vehicle-to-RSU and
RSU-to-SP communications.
6.1. Computational Costs
For the proposed PPTM scheme, when a vehicle Vj generates an encrypted report
PIDj||Yj||Cj1||Cj2||TS||σj, it performs two exponentiation operations in Zn2 to calculate Cj1 and Cj2,
and one multiplication in G to build the vehicle’s signature σj. After collecting vehicles’ reports,
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the RSU verifies the received reports with N + 1 pairing operations. Besides, the RSU also aggregates
vehicles’ reports to obtain the aggregated vehicle and speed information, which requires N − 1
multiplication operations. However, since the multiplication operations in Zn2 is negligible compared
with the time-consuming exponentiation and pairing operations, the time costs can be omitted.
In addition, to generate the signature, it also performs one multiplication operation in G. As for
the SP, it needs to verify the aggregated data sent from the RSU and obtain the aggregated data, which
cost one pairing operation in G and two exponentiation operations in Zn2 . Here, we use Cn, Ce, Cm
to denote the computational cost of an exponentiation operation in Zn2 , a pairing operation in G,
and a multiplication operation in G, respectively. Then, the total computation costs for the vehicle,
RSU, and SP will be 2 ∗ Cn + Cm, (N + 1) ∗ Ce + Cm, and Ce + 2 ∗ Cn, respectively.
Our proposed PPTM scheme enables each vehicle to embed its multiple speed into one compressed
data, and thus large computational costs can be saved. To compare the efficiency of PPTM, a traditional
approach denoted by TRPM is considered, which encrypts every individual speed information at
the corresponding road segment. Under the same setting, a vehicle has to generate M ciphertexts,
consuming M exponentiation operations in Zn2 to perform the encryption. In addition, for the
ciphertexts, the vehicle is required to generate one signature, which needs one multiplication operation
in G. Thus, the total time costs will be M ∗ Cn + Cm. For the RSU, it performs batch verification
to authenticate the reports, which takes N + 1 pairing operations. However, since the number of
ciphertexts in TRPM is much more than that in PPTM, i.e., (M ∗ N vs. M ∗ 2), the RSU has to perform
more multiplication operations for speed aggregation. Then, the RSU generates a signature and
forwards it to the RSU, which will execute M exponentiation operations to recover the aggregated
speed in all road segments. Thus, the total computational costs of an individual vehicle, the RSU, and
the SP will be M ∗ Cn + Cm, (N + 1) ∗ Ce + Cm, and Ce + M ∗ Cn, respectively.
We list the computational costs of PPTM and TRPM in Table 1. In addition, we conducted
extensive experiments to compare the efficiency of our proposed PPTM scheme. We used nodes with
1.5 GHz and 2 GB RAM as resource-constrained nodes (i.e., vehicles), and used a laptop with Intel
Core i7-7600U CPU and 16 GB RAM as the entities that hold enhanced computational capacities (i.e.,
the RSU and cloud). The security number of κ and κ1 were set as 1024 bits and 160 bits. All experiments
were executed 10 times, and the average results were selected. The experimental results indicate that
each single multiplication operation in G took 2 ms, each exponentiation operation in Zn2 took 5 ms,
and each pairing operation in G took 2 ms. To validate the efficiency of our proposed PPTM, we show
the computational costs in terms of the number of vehicles and road segments in Figures 5–8.
In Figure 5, we can see that, as the number of road segments increased, the time TRPM took at the
vehicle side increased linearly, while it was relatively stable in PPTM. The reason is that PPTM uses
a well defined super-increasing sequence to aggregate the speeds before performing data encryption.
We then plot the time cost of the fog node in Figure 6. Since the reports were verified through a batch
way, the scheme was efficient at the RSU side. For example, when the number of vehicles reached 500,
PPTM only needed 0.994s to finish reports authentication and ciphertexts aggregation. To validate
the efficiency of the proposed PPTM, we further conducted a comparative experiment by changing
the number of vehicles and road segments. As shown in Figure 7, it was obvious that our proposed
PPTM scheme performed much better than the traditional TRPM scheme, which demonstrated the
correctness of the complexity analysis in Table 1. The result shown in Figure 8 also demonstrates the
efficiency of our proposed scheme in terms of the average speed calculation at the SP side.
Table 1. Comparison of computational complexity.
PPTM TRPM
Vehicle 2 ∗ Cn + Cm M ∗ Cn + Cm
RSU (N + 1) ∗ Ce + Cm (N + 1) ∗ Ce + Cm
SP Ce + 2 ∗ Cn Ce + M ∗ Cn
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Figure 5. Computational costs of ciphertexts generation at the vehicle side.
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Figure 6. Computational costs of ciphertexts generation and reports batch verification at the RSU side.
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Figure 7. Computational costs with varying number of vehicles and road segments at the RSU side.
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6.2. Communication Overhead
We then analyzed the communication overhead of the proposed scheme. Generally, the
communications of PPTM includes two parts, i.e., vehicle-to-RSU communication and RSU-to-SP
communication. For the vehicle-to-RSU communication, each individual vehicle generates its
traffic report and transmits it to the RSU. Recalling our previous description, the vehicle’s report
is defined as PIDj||Yj||Cj1||Cj2||TS||σj and the size is Sv = |PIDj| + 160 + 2048 ∗ 2 + |TS| + 160,
where the size of n and G were set as 1024 bits and 160 bits, respectively. RSU is responsible
for collecting N reports in its coverage region, thus the total communication cost for the RSU is
SR = N ∗ Sv. In the traditional TRPM scheme, each vehicle needs to generate a ciphertext with
2048-bits for every road segment. Then, the total communication cost of vehicle-to-RSU will be
Sv = |PIDj| + 160 + 2048 ∗ M + |TS| + 160. We then considered the RSU-to-SP communication.
In PPTM, RSU transmits the aggregated report IDr||C1||C2||TS||σr to the SP, which costs SS =
|IDr|+ 2048 ∗ 2+ |TS|+ 160 bits. Alternatively, TRPM needs to forward each segment’s aggregated
report to the SP, which requires |IDr|+ 2048 ∗M + |TS|+ 160 bits. Based on the analysis presented
above, it was obvious that our proposed PPTM could significantly reduce the bandwidth costs
compared with the traditional TRPM.
7. Related Works
Recently, traffic monitoring has received considerable attention as it is important to reduce fuel
waste, air pollution, and improve drivers’ driving experience. By collecting vehicles’ traffic information,
the traffic conditions can be better identified. Based on this, many schemes and applications have
been proposed. However, the security and privacy of vehicles are still major concerns [22,23]. In fact,
if drivers’ privacy is not being strictly protected, they are usually reluctant to submit their data.
To realize privacy-preserving traffic monitoring, some schemes [12,24–26] have been proposed.
For example, Chim et al. [24] presented a secure navigation scheme that uses RSUs to guide vehicles in
a distributed way. However, since all vehicles can obtain a same master key, their scheme cannot defend
against the insider attacks. By using vehicular cloud and zero-knowledge proof, Sur et al. [25] designed
a secure navigation approach. Nevertheless, the credentials cannot be reused, which introduces more
computational costs. Ni et al. [12] and Wang et al. [27] realized real-time navigation by collecting
vehicles’ speed information. With the technology of randomizable signature, their schemes can achieve
conditional privacy preservation. Rabieh et al. [26] further proposed a privacy-preserving route
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reporting scheme. In their scheme, vehicles’ future routes are collected, which would be used to
calculate the number of vehicles appearing in next routes.
Although many efforts have been made to realize privacy-preserving traffic monitoring, most
of them, nevertheless, ignore the time link attack, as described in Figure 1. Since vehicles are
required to report their driving reports periodically or at different road segments, by linking their
arriving time, vehicles’ trajectories can be easily identified. That is, the traditional technologies to
protect drivers’ identity privacy, such as pseudonyms or randomizable signature, are not suitable
in certain VANET-based applications. Besides, to preserve data privacy, cryptographic primitives
such as elliptic curve cryptography [28] and key and key aggregation are proposed [29], which may
introduce extensive workloads on the vehicles. Inspired by the work in [30], we applied the use of
super-increasing sequence to aggregate vehicles’ routes and speed information. In this way, vehicles’
identity and location privacy are preserved.
8. Conclusions
Vehicles’ speed information is important to monitor the traffic conditions and prevent road
congestion, however it threatens drivers’ privacy. In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving
traffic monitoring scheme by collecting vehicles’ speed and route information. The main idea is to
aggregate multiple speeds into one compressed datum so that vehicles’ identity and location privacy
will not be disclosed. Security analysis indicates that the proposed PPTM scheme is secure and
privacy-preserving. Besides, extensive simulations demonstrated its efficiency. In the future, we will
try to achieve privacy-preserving traffic monitoring without the assistance of the RSU.
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